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Has globalisation reduced 
monetary policy independence? 
M S Mohanty and Michela Scatigna
1 
1. Introduction 
Growing global financial integration has influenced monetary policy in important ways. Theory predicts 
that, other things being equal, with a highly open capital account, monetary authorities lose 
independence in setting domestic interest rates. The effectiveness of monetary policy and its 
transmission would then depend on the exchange rate regimes in place. For example, as predicted by 
the Mundell-Fleming model, when the exchange rate is fixed, capital flows will equalise domestic and 
international interest rates, with monetary policy losing its ability to influence domestic activity.
2 On the 
other hand, when the exchange rate is flexible, monetary policy will be effective in part through the 
exchange rate. A reduction in domestic interest rates, say to promote growth, would lead to capital 
outflows. At the same time, it would depreciate the exchange rate, with expansionary effects. When 
countries maintain capital account restrictions, or the domestic and foreign assets are not perfect 
substitutes, central banks may retain control over monetary policy even with a fixed exchange rate. 
Recent developments have shown, however, that, while many countries have adopted more flexible 
exchange rate regimes, they often intervene to dampen exchange rate movements. In many cases, 
such intervention may be warranted by sharp volatility in capital flows. For instance, after rising to 3% 
of GDP in the first half of the 1990s total net capital flows to developing countries fell to about 1% 
during 2000-03. Some have characterised the recent trends in capital flows to emerging economies by 
such common features as frequent “market closures” and “sudden stops” of inflows.
3 In a number of 
countries, volatility in capital flows has been associated with speculative currency attacks, resulting in 
large changes in the exchange rate, high inflation and substantial loss of output. 
Such developments raise several questions. How does the choice of an exchange rate regime affect 
monetary policy independence? Should central banks attempt to reduce vulnerability to crises by 
containing currency fluctuations when exchange rates have, in principle, been allowed to vary freely? 
If so, how should this best be done given the various policy instruments available? What dilemmas 
might the central bank face when exchange rate volatility is dampened by using the interest rate 
instrument? Are other policy instruments useful in reducing such dilemmas? The rest of the paper 
addresses these issues. Section 2 briefly discusses the choice of exchange rate regime in the context 
of greater global financial integration. Section 3 reviews recent movements of exchange rates and 
addresses the reasons why the authorities might wish to resist such movements. Section 4 explores 
the implications for monetary policy. Section 5 discusses the role of foreign exchange intervention, 
while section 6 focuses on capital account policies. 
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2.  The choice of exchange rate regime 
Countries have sought to limit their vulnerability to a currency crisis by choosing an appropriate 
exchange rate regime. Theory indicates that it is impossible for an economy to simultaneously pursue 
a fixed exchange rate, an independent monetary policy and an open capital account (the so-called 
“impossible trinity”). Once policymakers have decided to liberalise cross-border capital movements, 
the choice then is to either fix the exchange rate or have an independent monetary policy (or some 
combination of the two). 
Yet views differ regarding the sustainability of exchange rate regimes. According to one view (the 
“bipolar” view), soft exchange rate pegs that take various intermediate positions between full exchange 
rate flexibility and hard pegs are less viable for economies with substantial involvement in international 
capital markets.
4 The argument is that such exchange rate regimes make countries more vulnerable to 
currency attacks.
5 This has given rise to the “hollowing of the middle” hypothesis; in the long run the 
only sustainable option for countries is to move to either a hard peg (representing regimes such as 
currency boards, dollarisation and a common regional currency) or a fully floating exchange rate 
regime. 
A supporting set of arguments for the bipolar view emphasises the particular limitations of soft pegs in 
the context of emerging economies. According to this view, some countries are unable to borrow in 
their own currencies (“original sin”). This will force them to rely more on foreign currency borrowing, 
especially as cross-border capital restrictions are removed.
6 This increases their vulnerability to 
currency mismatches and large exchange rate depreciations, reducing the advantages of a floating 
exchange rate. Others attribute such currency mismatch problems to emerging economies’ financial 
imperfections that can be removed by appropriate macroeconomic and regulatory polices rather than 
to their inability to borrow in their own currencies; see Goldstein and Turner (2004). 
An alternative view (the so-called “fear of floating” view) notes that many emerging economies, in 
practice, prefer to limit exchange rate movements while, in principle, they may have adopted a flexible 
exchange rate regime. Such resistance to floating arises from their low policy and institutional 
credibility and high degree of pass-through of exchange rate changes into prices; see Calvo and 
Reinhart (2002). One implication of this view is that floating exchange rate regimes are likely to differ 
by degrees, depending on the strength of the authorities’ preference for exchange rate smoothing. 
Goldstein (2002) has recently suggested a “managed floating plus” regime for emerging economies 
where three elements - exchange rate smoothing, inflation targeting and regulatory and market 
development policies to reduce currency mismatches - are said to lead to a credible exchange rate 
regime with considerable independence for monetary policy. 
Notwithstanding the competing views, most recent discussions have tended to emphasise the need for 
greater exchange rate flexibility in emerging economies. Two major developments seem to have 
shaped much of this view. First, as the Mexican and Asian crises in the second half of the 1990s 
demonstrated, a fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate often led to significant overvaluation of the real 
exchange rate. This encouraged banks and the corporate sector to borrow excessively from abroad 
and at short term, increasing the vulnerability of countries to capital flow reversal. As the exchange 
rate became highly overvalued, the interest rate required to stabilise the exchange rate rose to a very 
high level, setting the stage for successful currency attacks: see Fischer (2001). In more recent years, 
such problems have been further highlighted, for instance, by the collapse of the crawling exchange 
rate regime in Turkey in early 2001. In contrast, with the exchange rate allowed to move in both 
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directions in Mexico after the 1995 crisis, the private sector’s expectation of an implicit exchange rate 
guarantee disappeared; see Ortiz (2000). 
Second, with growing trade openness and the increased incidence of external shocks, the role of the 
exchange rate as an automatic stabiliser has become better appreciated. To the extent that wages 
and prices are rigid, a fall in external demand is expected to lead to a fall in both the nominal and real 
exchange rate, thus partially mitigating the impact of the adverse shock. Moreover, a flexible exchange 
rate may enable the central bank to use monetary instruments to influence domestic spending, further 
cushioning the economy against external shocks. Recent empirical evidence generally supports the 
positive influence of exchange rate flexibility on the trade balance and output in emerging economies. 
For example, over a large sample of countries with different exchange rate regimes, Broda (2001) 
shows that developing countries with a flexible exchange rate were better able to cope with terms-of-
trade shocks than those with fixed exchange rates.
7 
To describe the issue from another perspective, when the exchange rate is fixed, prices must fall 
significantly to bring about the required real exchange rate and current account adjustments. From this 
standpoint, a fixed exchange rate can make deflation more likely when the economy is subject to large 
and frequent negative external shocks. Goldstein (2002) points out that during 1999 and 2000, when 
the Federal Reserve was raising interest rates to stabilise an overheating economy, Argentina had to 
raise rates although it was already going through a severe recession. By the time the Federal Reserve 
started to reduce rates in 2001, recession in Argentina had become well entrenched in the presence of 
large external debts. 
The recent experience 
Reflecting these insights and developments, there has been a recent trend towards flexible exchange 
rate regimes. For example, according to the IMF’s (2003)
8 de facto classification of exchange rate 
systems, the number of emerging economies (out of 32 systemically important economies) opting for a 
flexible exchange rate regime has risen from a little above 15% in 1990 to about one half at the end of 
2001. The share of hard peg regimes has seen a moderate increase from under 10% to a little above 
15% during the same period, while that of the intermediate regimes has fallen sharply from over three 
quarters to less than 35%. Table A1 in the annex shows the exchange rate and monetary policy 
regimes in emerging market economies between 1997 and 2002. China, Hong Kong SAR,
9 Malaysia 
and Saudi Arabia are among the monetary regimes with a fixed exchange rate. However, with the 
exception of Hong Kong, other countries have maintained some degree of capital controls, and hence, 
in effect, retained various degrees of monetary independence. After a prolonged period of market 
volatility, Venezuela fixed its exchange rate and announced capital controls in early 2003.  
Other countries have adopted some form of floating arrangement. Many have combined it with inflation 
targeting - starting from Chile in 1990 to Peru in 2003 - to provide a credible nominal anchor for 
monetary policy. In some other countries (for example India), the nominal anchor role is played by 
monetary aggregates or a combination of monetary and other financial variables. In Argentina, the 
abandonment of the currency board in 2002 has led to a floating exchange rate. Under the transitional 
arrangement, monetary policy is being conducted by targeting base money. Singapore has adopted 
the nominal effective exchange rate as an operating target for monetary policy, with the stance of the 
exchange rate policy determining the short-term interest rate. The major economies in central Europe, 
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, have introduced inflation targeting with a floating 
exchange rate. Hungary has adopted a horizontal band for the exchange rate with the central parity 
being allowed to move within ±15% since May 2001. 
The institutional framework for exchange rate management varies across countries. In many countries, 
the central bank is responsible (second last column of Table A1 in the annex), but in Israel and 
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Hungary the government has sole responsibility for the conduct of exchange rate policy. In many 
others (for example China, Korea, Poland, Russia and Turkey), some form of institutional framework 
exists for coordination between the government and the central bank. Country experiences also differ 
regarding the monitoring of exchange rate developments. Most countries focus on the bilateral 
exchange rate against either the dollar or the euro (mainly central European countries) for monitoring 
purposes (last column of Table A1). Nevertheless, effective exchange rates (both nominal and real) 
also appear to matter, particularly for monitoring long-run currency misalignments and changes in the 
competitive position.  
3.  Exchange rate flexibility in practice 
Indicators of volatility 
Table 1 presents the standard deviations of three major exchange rate indicators - the bilateral, the 
nominal effective and the real effective exchange rates for two periods: 1991 to 1996 and 1999 to 
2003. This excludes two crisis years, viz 1997 and 1998, when many countries, affected by the global 
financial crisis, saw a sharp increase in exchange rate volatility. As the table shows, with the exception 
of Indonesia, bilateral exchange rate volatility among the floaters in Asia is only marginally higher, and 
has fallen in India. In central and eastern Europe, excepting Russia, there is some evidence of greater 
exchange rate volatility against the euro.  
In Latin America, the volatility of bilateral exchange rates fell in Brazil, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela 
(until 2002) in the recent period, although this might reflect a decline in the incidence of large 
exchange market collapses from the previous period. Exchange rate volatility has risen substantially in 
Argentina, following the collapse of the currency board, as well as in Chile since the transition to a 
flexible regime in 1999. This trend is observed in both the nominal and real effective exchange rate 
indicators. Elsewhere, South Africa and Turkey have witnessed a significant rise in exchange rate 
volatility in recent years, while the exchange rate appears to have become more stable in Algeria. 
These trends are further confirmed by decomposing monthly exchange rate changes into different 
frequencies (Annex Table A2). In most countries, monthly exchange rate changes within the range of 
±0-2% are more frequent than say ±2-5% or more. At the same time, the number of instances of 
monthly exchange rate changes falling between ±2-5% has increased in the more recent period, 
suggesting movement towards more flexibility. Nevertheless, such instances appear to be less 
frequent in Asia and several Latin American economies than, for instance, in Chile, Hungary, South 
Africa and Turkey as well as many industrial economies.  
Why do countries limit exchange rate movements? 
Authorities may intervene to limit exchange rate movements.
10 However, unlike a fixed exchange rate, 
such interventions may not target a specific level of the exchange rate but may influence its path or 
volatility. The arguments for such smoothing tend to focus on special conditions facing emerging 
economies’ financial markets. For example, the tradable sector’s capacity to adjust to sudden changes 
in the exchange rate may be limited. As a result, volatile exchange rates can discourage exporters and 
importers from international trade. 
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Bilateral exchange rate  Nominal effective rate  Real effective rate   
1991-96 1999-2003 1991-96 1999-2003 1991-96 1999-2003 
China  4.0 0.0 3.8 0.7 4.1 1.1 
Hong Kong SAR  0.1  0.1 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.4 
India  3.1 0.6 2.9 1.3 2.9 1.8 
Indonesia 0.2  5.4  1.4 5.2 1.5 5.1 
Korea  0.7 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.8 
Malaysia 1.2  0.0  1.3 1.1 1.4 1.1 
Philippines 1.4  1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.8 
Singapore 0.9  1.1  0.7 0.9 0.8 1.1 
Thailand 0.4  1.6  0.9 1.5 1.0 1.6 
Argentina 3.7  6.6  4.6 6.6 2.5 5.8 
Brazil   11.1  5.3    11.2 5.3 3.0 5.4 
Chile  1.6 2.9 2.1 2.4 2.0 2.4 
Colombia 2.1  2.2  2.0 4.8 1.9 4.9 
Mexico 4.6  1.9  4.9 2.2 5.0 2.2 
Peru  3.9 1.0 4.1 1.5 4.2 1.6 
Venezuela 6.0  4.6  6.1 4.9 5.6 4.8 
Czech Republic
2  1.5 3.1 0.6 1.4 0.7 1.6 
Hungary
2  1.5 2.7 1.7 1.4 1.6 1.4 
Poland
2  1.1 2.6 1.1 2.4 1.5 2.5 
Russia
2  5.2 1.3 6.0 2.3 5.3 2.5 
Algeria 4.7  1.8  4.8 1.9 4.8 2.0 
Israel 1.8  1.8  1.2 2.2 1.4 2.0 
Saudi Arabia  0.0  0.0 1.5 1.4 1.7 1.4 
South Africa  1.7  3.9 1.7 3.6 1.7 3.6 
Turkey  4.8 5.4  ...  ...  3.4 5.3 
1  Measured as the standard deviation of monthly changes in the exchange rate; averages over the period.   
2  First period: 
1994-96. 
Sources: National data; BIS calculations. 
 
Another reason is currency mismatches, which increase the probability of a sharp fall in exchange 
rates, exposing banks and the corporate sectors with unhedged foreign currency liabilities to 
significant balance sheet losses.
11 When governments have a large outstanding foreign currency debt 
or debt indexed to the exchange rate, large currency depreciations can raise questions about fiscal 
sustainability, increasing risk premia and sovereign spreads. Many participants in the meeting argued 
that intervention could not be avoided in presence of significant currency mismatches. For instance, 
liability dollarisation played a special role in the recent Brazilian and Turkish financial crises. Similarly, 
with three quarters of debt being dominated in dollars, devaluation had strong contractionary 
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implications for Peru’s economy. In some countries (eg Poland) already weak balance sheets of firms 
aggravated problems of currency depreciation, requiring central bank intervention.  
A further reason is that emerging economies face a high degree of pass-through of exchange rate 
changes into inflation. This makes them particularly vulnerable to persistent exchange rate 
depreciations. Graph 1 shows estimates of the pass-through coefficients (over two to four quarters) 
according to central banks’ own estimates. The pass-through coefficient is generally higher in Latin 
America than in Asia or central Europe. Yet, with the exception of Brazil, Indonesia and Turkey, the 
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1  Increase in the inflation rate following a 10% depreciation of the exchange rate; estimates consider different periods across 
countries. 
Source: Central banks. 
Moreover, some argue that because of their thin markets emerging economies are more vulnerable to 
one-way expectations and herd behaviour.
12 In such circumstances, the chances of disorderly 
depreciation are high as firms involved in international trade as well as foreign investors can quickly 
change their financing strategy in response to an initial depreciation, giving the exchange rate its own 
momentum. Hungary’s recent experience provides an important example.
13 A rise in inflation above 
the target in early 2003, combined with the expectation that the authorities would not be able to 
contain the forint’s appreciation within the 15% band, led to a large inflow of speculative capital 
(€5 billion in two days). To stem currency appreciation, the central bank sharply lowered interest rates 
and later devalued the central parity of the forint. However, with inflation already high, these measures 
adversely affected the central bank’s credibility to fight inflation, leading, in turn, to large currency 
deprecation and a subsequent steep hike in the interest rate. 
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A consensus view in the meeting was that intervention could not stop a permanent change in the 
exchange rate. Since emerging market currency pressures tend to be associated with volatile capital 
flows, it is necessary to distinguish temporary from permanent capital inflows. For instance, resisting 
appreciation pressures and building reserves in response to a rise in short-term capital inflows can 
cushion the economy against volatile exchange rate movements. Nevertheless, this poses several 
practical challenges to central banks in determining the nature of inflows and the extent to which they 
are reversible.  
Have the factors changed? 
How far some of the above factors may have changed in the direction of allowing more tolerance for 
exchange rate flexibility in emerging economies remains an open question. For instance, to the extent 
that hedging and forward exchange markets have developed in many countries, exporters and firms 
with large foreign currency debts may be better able to protect themselves against foreign currency 
risks. Moreover, the hedging behaviour of firms may be regime dependent: the private sector’s 
incentive to hedge is lower when it believes that the authorities will resist sharp changes in exchange 
rates; see Eichengreen (2002). Allowing the exchange rate to move both ways can encourage 
hedging behaviour among firms. For instance, Ortiz (2000) notes that in Mexico the private sector 
demand for hedging rose significantly as the authorities let the peso move freely and removed 
restrictions on market participants operating in the forward market. As Table A3 in the annex shows, 
excepting a few cases, most emerging economies have by now removed restrictions on hedging 
against foreign currency risks. Moreover, such hedging markets appear to be well developed in a 
number of economies, particularly Brazil, the Czech Republic, India, Israel, Korea, Mexico, the 
Philippines and Poland, where swap, forward and option transactions constitute the main hedging 
instruments (second column of Table A3).  
There is some evidence that balance sheet mismatches may have declined in recent years. As a 
measure of currency mismatch, Table 2 presents the net foreign currency liability (foreign currency 
liabilities minus assets) of countries according to sectors in 1995 and 2002. With the exception of 
Brazil, Turkey and central European countries, the net foreign currency liabilities at the aggregate level 
appear to have fallen in a number of emerging economies. Nevertheless, such liabilities in the 
non-financial sector including government, corporate and household sectors (the category “others“ in 
Table 2) have either gone up or remained sizeable (for instance, in Brazil, Mexico, Poland, Thailand 
and Turkey among the countries covered in Table 2). To the extent that unhedged liabilities tend to be 
concentrated in this sector, balance sheet risks appear to remain high in many countries.  
However, some balance sheet mismatches can be reduced by developing domestic bond markets. 
Such markets can lower the dependence of firms and governments on foreign currency debts and 
increase their access to long-term funding, helping to reduce both currency and maturity mismatches. 
Recent trends show a considerable shift in financing pattern of firms and governments in emerging 
economies towards local bond markets. For instance, the ratio of domestic currency debt to GDP is 
estimated to have risen from 34% in 2000 to over 60% by the end of 2002 in Asia, and from 26% to 
about 50% in Latin America. During this period, domestic long-term marketable bonds financed over 
55% of fiscal deficits in Asia and about 60% in Latin America, suggesting reduced vulnerability to 
maturity mismatches.
14 Moreover, prudential regulation of the financial system can be a partial solution 
to the mismatch problem. For instance, restricting the foreign currency open position of the banking 
sector can limit some of the adverse systemic implications of large currency depreciations. As 
Table A3 in the annex shows, most emerging economies currently limit net (or gross) open foreign 
exchange positions of banks by linking them to their own funds or Tier 1 capital, with ratios ranging 
from 15% in Mexico and Venezuela to 20% in Indonesia, Korea and Chile, and 30% in Hungary. Hong 
Kong prescribes limits on individual currency exposures, while Peru sets restrictions on the global 
position of commercial banks based on their risk-adjusted capital. In countries where customers’ 
mismatches are high, measures to restrict them could also help. 
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Table 2 
Net foreign liabilities position
1 





  1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 1995 2002 
Hong Kong SAR    –55.4   –111.9    –34.9    –149.6      –90.3  –261.5 
India   –38.3
2   –48.2   19.5
2   5.0    101.4
2   57.2   101.3
2   58.1 
Indonesia   –18.4    –23.8    4.3    –4.3      
Korea   –32.9    –121.7    21.3    8.6  29.3  57.5  17.7   –55.8 
Malaysia   –25.1    –34.6    4.1    0.8    29.0    40.8   8   7 
Philippines
2     –10.2
     –1.7
     46.8    35.0 
Singapore   –68.5    –81.6    8.9    –15.9      –59.6    –97.5 
Thailand   –20.6
2   –34   1.1
2   1.5    76.1
2   78.7  56.6
2   46.1 
Argentina   51.7
3   64.7
3   6.37    8.1   –49.1   –85.5    9.0   –12.7 
Brazil   –51.5    –19.3    26.2    29.0   175.1   220.5 149.8    230.2 
Chile   –18.1    –15.4    1.3    –3.8  48.3  47.2  31.4   28 
Colombia   –10.1
4   –11.2   6.0
4  1.7    30.3
4   36.2    26.2
4   26.7 
Mexico   1.5    –48    –1    2.8 121.3 128.6   121.8    83.4 
Peru   –6.7    –9.6    –0.1   –0.2  27.6  22.2  20.9  12.4 
Venezuela   –2.7    2.0         
Czech Republic    –14.2    –23.7    2.9    –4.6   9.1  41.8  –2.2  13.5 
Hungary    8   –6   2    4   16   44   26   42 
Poland    –15    –30    –3    2   45    100   27   72 
Russia   –25
2   –47  –9
2   –6    –34
2   2    –68
2   –51 
Israel       5.6
2   7.4    43
2   18.4  48.6
2   25.8 
Saudi Arabia    –53.7    –40.9   –15.5    –13.4    0    0   –69.2   –54.3 
South Africa    –3.5    –3.5    9.1    1.7  11.3  11.7  16.9   9.9 
Turkey   –2.7    –8.3    –4    2.5    39.5
5   121.1
5   32.8   115.3 
1  In billions of US dollars.   
2  2000.   
3  Including government.   
4  1996.   
5  Gross. 
Source: Central banks. 
 
An additional factor that might increase tolerance for exchange rate flexibility is the decline in the 
exchange rate pass-through to inflation in some countries. For instance, over a large sample of 
industrial and emerging economies, Choudhri and Hakura (2001) show that the pass-through is 
significantly related to the level of the average inflation rate; a 10 % increase in inflation increases the 
long-run exchange rate pass-through by 0.06. Thus, the recent decline in inflation in many countries 
may have led to a reduction in the pass-through coefficient.
15 Another factor supporting lower pass-
through is the recent shift to inflation targeting, leading to more stable long-run inflation expectations. 
The increased tendency of firms to absorb exchange rate changes into their profits and to switch to 
local currency pricing to retain market share may have also played an important role. A flexible 
exchange rate may also have contributed to lower pass-through in some countries. In the absence of 
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significant currency overvaluation, firms are likely to view exchange rate changes as temporary and 
hence will be more willing to absorb additional costs in their margins.  
Yet another explanation attributes recent low pass-through to a much broader global phenomenon. In 
the past, most transitional economies including China restricted supply, with the global economy 
experiencing a general excess demand situation. By contrast, the recent movement to market-oriented 
economies by these countries led to global oversupply, low inflation and reduced pass-through of 
exchange rate changes into inflation.  
At the same time, the extent to which pass-through may remain low is unclear. One factor is that in a 
number of economies the cyclical influence on pass-through has been strong over the past few years. 
Large excess capacities have reduced the pricing power of firms, forcing them to absorb a large part 
of the costs. Such a situation can change as growth recovers and excess capacities disappear. 
Moreover, country experience suggests that the short-run pass-through can change suddenly in 
response to large currency depreciations. Brazil is a case in point. A sharp fall in the value of the real 
against the dollar in 2002 (over 40%) quickly fed into inflation. The historical rate of pass-through of 
the exchange rate into market prices, which was about 7%, suddenly spiked to 17% by the last quarter 
of 2002. About 46% of the inflation rate in that year was accounted for by the exchange rate 
depreciation.
16 
4.  Implications for monetary policy 
An interest rate response 
One instrument that countries might use to stabilise the exchange rate is the interest rate. Table A4 in 
the annex shows major episodes of exchange rate volatility in emerging economies from 2001 up to 
the middle of 2003 as defined by the central banks. During this period, many countries (notably Brazil, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines and Turkey) witnessed several episodes of major 
exchange rate volatility. A number of them relied on interest rate interventions to stem such volatility. 
In others, such a response may have been indirectly implied by central banks’ reaction to inflation 
pressures brought about by large exchange rate variations. This was, for instance, seen in South 
Africa at the beginning of 2002 as well as in Brazil during the second half of that year as both 
countries raised interest rates sharply to prevent depreciation-led inflation pressures.
17 In contrast, in 
Asia and central Europe, several countries reduced rates in response to rising appreciation pressures. 
Both India and Thailand cut interest rates in the second half of 2003, partly to discourage speculative 
capital inflows. Until the establishment of the special accounts to channel privatisation proceeds, the 
Czech National Bank had to use its policy rate frequently to stem strong appreciation pressures.
18 
In the literature, a standard way to evaluate the role of the exchange rate in interest rate developments 
is to estimate the central bank’s reaction function. Table 3 reports the short-run and long-run 
responses of the short-term interest rate to its various determinants for a selected group of emerging 
economies.
19 These estimates provide an indicator of the average relationship between the short-term 
interest rate, on the one hand, and inflation, the output gap and the changes in the real effective 
exchange rate, on the other.
20 Although the regression estimates pass the standard robustness 
checks, they may not adequately reflect more recent changes in central bank behaviour. 
Notwithstanding this caveat, an important finding that emerges from the table is that, with the 
exception of Chile, the interest rate response to the real exchange rate has been strong in most 
                                                       
16  See Banco Central Do Brasil (2003). 
17  Both countries eventually missed their inflation targets for 2002. 
18  See the paper by the Czech National Bank in this volume. 
19  This follows Taylor (2001). 
20  The model uses quarterly data starting in the early 1990s. The reaction function includes the current and one quarter lagged 
exchange rate terms to test whether the central bank’s response to the exchange rate is temporary or persistent. A 
statistically significant negative coefficient on both the current and lagged exchange rate term is a sign that central banks do 
not expect the exchange rate to be mean reverting: see Mohanty and Klau (2004). 26  BIS Papers No 23
 
emerging economies. The large negative coefficients (an increase represents an appreciation) confirm 





Elasticities from a simple reaction function
1 
Inflation Output  Exchange  rate   
Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term 
India  0.13 0.43 0.13 0.43   –0.18   –0.60 
Korea  0.66 1.53 0.29 0.67   –0.29   –0.67 
Philippines 0.51  0.71  0.35  0.49   –0.09   –0.13 
Thailand 0.56 1.33 0.37  0.88   –0.31   –0.74 
Brazil  0.08 0.29 0.98 3.50   –0.10   –0.36 
Chile  0.97 1.43 0.32 0.47   0.00   0.00 
Mexico  0.55 1.10 0.74  1.48   –0.79   –1.58 
Peru  0.19 1.36 0.15 1.07   –0.38   –2.71 
Czech 
Republic  0.12 0.75 0.32 2.00   0.03   0.19 
Hungary 0.20 0.80 0.35  1.40   –0.15   –0.60 
Poland  0.17 0.68 0.66 2.64   –0.05   –0.20 
South Africa  0.31  4.40  0.04  2.00   –0.12   –6.00 
1  Based on the open economy Taylor rule specification. 
Source: Mohanty and Klau (2003). 
 
Less monetary policy independence? 
Does responding to the exchange rate affect the main objectives of monetary policy - namely 
stabilising inflation and output volatility? To the extent that the exchange rate has significant 
implications for domestic prices, reacting to currency volatility may not reduce the central bank’s 
control over inflation. The recent success of emerging economies in reducing inflation to a low level 
might support such an argument. As Table A5 in the annex shows, inflation has been within the target 
or reference range in most countries during the past three years. This provides some evidence that 
countries which have contained exchange rate fluctuations have not compromised their inflation 
objectives in doing so. In contrast, many countries (Brazil, Indonesia, Russia, Turkey and Venezuela) 
that missed their inflation targets (or the threshold rates) happened to have experienced large 
currency depreciations. Ho and McCauley (2003) report similar findings over a longer time horizon.  
Nevertheless, there are also several arguments for not intervening against exchange rate fluctuations. 
First, interest rate interventions to resist currency depreciation can lead to significant long-run currency 
misalignments, disguising latent inflation pressures and increasing the probability of future 
devaluation. Second, such interventions might increase interest rate volatility, with significant adverse 
implications for output. Such a finding is generally supported by the estimates of interest rate response 
shown in Table 3 as well as by other studies. For instance, the estimates reported by Fraga et al 
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(2003) from a vector autoregression model show that exchange rate shocks explained roughly half of 
the interest rate forecast errors in Brazil during 1995 and 2002, and over 25% and 35%, respectively, 
in Korea and South Africa.  
Partly because of such diverse implications, the decision to change the interest rate in response to the 
exchange rate is likely to depend on the weights central banks assign to inflation and output 
stabilisation objectives. For example, a central bank placing a relatively high weight on output 
stabilisation may not respond to an exchange rate shock either because it is deemed temporary or 
because it is prepared to accept the first-round consequences for prices. In some cases, central banks 
have been prepared to accommodate a temporary deviation of inflation from the target. For example, 
in 2002 the Central Bank of Brazil allowed much of the first-round effect of the exchange rate to be 
reflected in prices, although it raised interest rates to check the second-round impacts. 
Central banks’ response might also depend on the source of the exchange rate shock. Some have 
argued that central banks should draw a distinction between demand and supply shocks for designing 
their interest response to the exchange rate: see Ball (1999, 2002). An adverse external demand 
shock is usually accompanied by a depreciation of the exchange rate that tends to put upward 
pressure on prices but stimulates exports, partly offsetting the lost output. Therefore, raising rates to 
stem such depreciation may considerably increase output volatility compared to inflation volatility. On 
the other hand, an exchange rate depreciation caused by a financial shock (for example, a sudden 
reversal of capital inflows) is likely to raise both demand and inflation. Raising interest rates against 
such exchange rate changes could perhaps stabilise both inflation and output.  
Persistent exchange rate depreciations might pose a different challenge to central banks. They could 
result in a sustained period of high interest rates and recession. Yet an inflation targeting framework 
offers a number of options: targeting a measure of domestic inflation that excludes the effects of the 
exchange rate;
22 adopting a longer target horizon over which inflation can converge to the target; 
expanding the target range within which inflation can be allowed to move; and targeting inflation over 
the cycle.
23 The usefulness of each of the alternatives will depend on how they affect inflation 
expectations. For example, countries where the inflation targeting experience is new and the central 
bank has not achieved the required credibility may prefer a relatively rigid framework which could help 
them lower inflation expectations. On the other hand, where such credibility is firmly in place, central 
banks can afford to be more accommodative to exchange rate shocks.  
Another solution to such dilemmas could lie in the use of other policy instruments. For instance, the 
authorities might use foreign exchange intervention to stabilise the exchange rate, while devoting 
monetary policy to domestic objectives. In the past, many countries have also resorted to capital 
account restrictions (or liberalisation) to stem exchange rate pressures. How far does use of such 
instruments enhance monetary policy independence? The following two sections examine these two 
options.  
5.  Foreign exchange intervention 
An alternative instrument is direct intervention in the foreign exchange market. A particular aspect of 
intervention is that a country’s ability to resist currency depreciation is limited by its stock of foreign 
exchange reserves and its access to potential credit lines. Such limitations can be temporarily lowered 
by forward market intervention, where the central bank commits to deliver foreign exchange at a future 
date. However, as the experience of East Asia during the 1997-98 crises revealed, the effectiveness of 
such intervention against speculative currency attacks remains doubtful. It also runs the serious risk of 
exposing the central bank’s balance sheet to any eventual devaluation. As a result, foreign exchange 
intervention can substitute for interest rate intervention only to a limited extent. Eventually authorities 
may have to consider raising interest rates. Conversely, a country does not face a rigid limit in 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves to resist currency appreciations. Nevertheless, creating 
                                                       
22  Ball (1999) argues that this will greatly reduce output volatility at the cost of some increased short-run inflation volatility. 
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domestic reserves as a counterpart also brings its own risks and challenges. This will be discussed 
below. 
Recent trends and tactics 
As shown by Table A4 in the annex, in recent years, many countries have resorted to foreign 
exchange intervention during periods of major market volatility, and some (the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Indonesia, Peru and the Philippines) combined it with monetary policy measures.
24 Graph 2 
presents monthly changes in reserves by central banks averaged for various regions during 1999 to 
2003. In Asia, central banks have stepped up their net purchases of foreign exchange since 2001. 
Reflecting this trend, between 2000 and 2003 (up to August), total foreign exchange reserves of 
non-Japan Asian central banks grew by over $300 billion, with China, India and Korea accounting for 
the bulk of the increase. In several cases, central banks also intervened to reduce depreciation 
pressures: for instance, Korea in March 2003 following increased geopolitical uncertainties, and the 
Philippines early this year. In central Europe, net reserve changes suggest sporadic interventions by 
central banks in recent months given that many countries attempted to smooth the market impact of 
large, one-shot capital inflows. On the other hand, reflecting increased volatility in capital flows, 
reserve changes have been more volatile in Latin America than in other regions. 
Circumstances leading to intervention have varied across countries. In countries with fixed exchange 
rates (eg Hong Kong, China, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia) central banks intervened in support of their 
exchange rate pegs, as large current account surpluses and capital inflows led to upward pressure on 
currencies. One factor noted by many countries in the meeting was the role of speculative capital 
inflows in central banks’ decision to intervene. In Thailand, although the economy was still recovering, 
an increase in the expected return on Thai assets encouraged large short-term capital inflows during 
2003, leading to central bank intervention and the imposition of controls on non-residents’ investment 
in domestic currency assets. In Saudi Arabia volatility in oil prices was accompanied by exchange rate 
pressures. In such circumstances, sending a credible signal through intervention was thought 
necessary to stabilise the foreign exchange market. In some countries (eg the Philippines) a major aim 
of intervention was to reduce the seasonal gap between demand and supply of foreign exchange. In 
India, intervention decision was partly guided by the “Dutch disease” syndrome, as software related 
inflows and remittances have been associated with a general appreciation of the exchange rate.  
Yet another factor influencing intervention policy in some countries was the nature of exchange rate 
volatility. In Brazil, for instance, because the depreciation was expected to be temporary during the 
early phase of the 2001 crisis, the central bank did not intervene to resist the currency pressure. But 
with sustained downward pressure on the exchange rate, the authorities decided to intervene through 
several channels including the interest rate, foreign exchange swaps and dollar-indexed bonds. By 
contrast, when the currency depreciation in 2002 was triggered by a crisis of confidence in the 
Brazilian economy, the authorities decided not to intervene in the foreign exchange market, but raised 
interest rates to a high level. 
Regarding the tactics of intervention, most operations in Asia have been through the spot market and 
foreign exchange swaps. In Latin America the tactics have varied across countries. For example, in 
Chile the central bank responded to the contagion pressure from Argentina during the third quarter of 
2001 by announcing sterilised intervention and increasing the supply of foreign exchange hedging 
instruments. Brazil responded to heavy exchange rate depreciation pressure in the second half of 
2001 by stepping up the issuance of dollar-indexed securities. However, as doubts about the 
government’s capacity to meet its debt obligations made market participants increasingly reluctant to 
hold such dollar-indexed securities, the central bank announced in July 2002 daily auctions of a fixed 
amount of foreign currency from its reserves. More recently, the authorities have began to put more 
emphasis on local bond financing.  
 
                                                       
24  In addition, countries may use regular foreign exchange operations to smooth day-to-day exchange rate movements that 
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1  Regional averages; in billions of US dollars. 
Sources: IMF; national data. 
Some countries have set up automatic mechanisms that might help ease exchange rate pressures. 
For example, Colombia has introduced a system of put options by which the public can buy (sell) 
foreign exchange from (to) the central bank if the exchange rate deviates by a certain margin from a 
moving average for the past few weeks. Such mechanisms might help to contain exchange rate 
volatility in both directions. Until its discontinuance in July 2001, Mexico operated a similar system for 
its foreign exchange operations.  
Is intervention effective? 
The literature has discussed several channels through which foreign exchange interventions might 
work.
25 To the extent that they are not sterilised they can change monetary conditions and hence the 
current and the expected path of the exchange rate (the monetary channel). Such interventions also 
imply a change in the relative stock of domestic and foreign assets in investors’ portfolio, which can 
lead to a change in their returns - assuming they are imperfect substitutes - and the exchange rate in 
turn (the portfolio channel). Moreover, the central bank’s intervention in the foreign exchange market 
could give signals about the future stance of monetary policy. For example, sales of foreign currency 
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today might lead traders to expect a tighter monetary policy in future, leading to the appreciation of the 
spot exchange rate (the signalling channel). 
Research has been inconclusive about the effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in the major 
industrial countries.
26 For example, the Jurgensen Report (1983) analysing the experience of 
G7  countries in the 1970s, argued that intervention may have a small but transitory effect on the 
exchange rate. Empirical evidence since then has been mixed and sensitive to the estimation method, 
time period and intervention strategy. In a recent study, Galati and Melick (2002) show that, while 
intervention in specific episodes succeeded in changing traders’ expectations about the exchange 
rate, there is no evidence that, on average, intervention on its own had a systematic impact on the 
exchange rate.
27 Suggested reasons include the decline in the size of reserves in industrial economies 
in relation to market turnover, and regular sterilisation of reserve operations by the central banks.  
Empirical studies for the emerging economies are rather scanty. However, some argue that foreign 
exchange interventions may be more effective in emerging economies than in the industrial 
economies.
28 First, in many countries, the central bank’s foreign exchange operations may be large in 
relation to the total foreign exchange market turnover or interbank trading. Central banks may 
dominate market activity for several reasons: they act as market-makers, discharge various agency 
functions for the government, and require the private sector to surrender a part of their exchange 
earnings. For example, the share of the central bank in total foreign exchange turnover exceeded 9% 
in Russia in 2000 and 4% in India in 2002, providing some credence to this view. Many countries have 
also in the past issued exchange rate-linked bonds to influence exchange rate expectations.  
Second, foreign exchange interventions are not always sterilised in emerging economies. For 
instance, to maximise the impact on the exchange rate, central banks may prefer not to sterilise, 
particularly during speculative currency pressures, while they may be willing to fully or partially sterilise 
in normal circumstances. This has been demonstrated in many recent episodes of exchange market 
volatility. In the Philippines, the central bank did not sterilise its foreign exchange sales to avoid 
infusing liquidity into the market when speculative activities were strong. Similarly, the Central Bank of 
Chile preferred unsterilised to sterilised intervention during the speculative currency attack on the peso 
in 1998 because, if unchecked, the depreciation would have raised the inflation rate above the target. 
Third, some have argued that, because of their great importance and regulatory powers, central banks 
in emerging economies may possess information advantages over the dealers, which they may use to 
enhance the effectiveness of their intervention. They may also combine moral suasion (through 
licensing requirements and supervisory or regulatory powers) with intervention to exert still greater 
influence on the exchange rate: see Canales-Kriljenko (2003). 
Is there a limit to reserve accumulation? 
External aspects 
A difficult question is whether central banks face a limit to holding reserves. There are both external 
and domestic implications. One view, based on external considerations, argues that a country’s stock 
of reserves depends on its perceptions about vulnerability. A stylised version of this argument is the 
early literature on optimal reserves, which viewed central banks’ demand for reserves as a stock 
adjustment process: see Frankel and Jovanovic (1981), Frankel (1983) and Flood and Marion (2001). 
According to this hypothesis, countries facing higher adjustment costs from an eventual correction to a 
temporary external disequilibrium would tend to hold higher reserves. But reserves also imply a cost in 
terms of the return forgone on domestic assets. Hence an optimal choice involves a trade-off between 
the benefits from and the costs of reserve accumulation. 
                                                       
26  For recent surveys, see Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Galati and Melick (2002). 
27  A notable exception is Ito (2002), who argues that recent foreign exchange intervention in Japan has had a strong impact on 
the exchange rate, presumably reflecting the effectiveness of the signalling channel. Similarly, Fatum and Hutchison (2003) 
find statistical evidence of a positive short-run impact of intervention on the Deutsche mark/dollar exchange rate during 1985 
to 1995. They argue that such intervention may have worked not only through the usual signalling channel, but also by 
conveying central banks’ views on economic fundamentals. 
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Some argue that perceived adjustment costs facing emerging economies may have gone up with their 
growing global financial integration. Such a perception may have been further strengthened by the 
increased frequency of emerging market crises in recent years and the associated large output losses. 
Others argue that, as emerging economies have limited and only conditional access to the 
international capital market, they are likely to hold large precautionary reserves as an insurance 
against future negative shocks.
29 Yet another factor could be the recent trend among rating agencies 
and foreign investors to associate a country’s solvency with its reserve holding - higher reserves then 
reduce a country’s credit risk premium. For example, Mexico’s reserve accumulation policy during 
1996-2000 seemed to have been influenced by investors’ perception about sovereign risk.
30 Other 
country-specific factors might also play a role. In India, for instance, reserve management objectives 
reflect considerations such as minimising foreign exchange “liquidity risks” and exposure to 
unanticipated events.
31 The Reserve Bank of India therefore monitors a wide range of indicators, 
including the current account balance, short-term external liabilities and volatility of capital flows in 
deciding the level of reserves it wishes to hold.  
There is, nevertheless, very little agreement about the optimal level of reserves for a country. It would 
also depend on whether reserve accumulation reflects the objective of reducing external vulnerability 
or containing exchange rate movements. In the former case, the central bank’s demand for reserves is 
expected to decline as reserves rise in relation to certain vulnerability indicators. As an illustration, 
Table 4 compares the standard reserve adequacy indicators of countries between 1996 and 2003. All 
indicators have shown significant improvements in Asia. For instance, the ratio of short-term debt (less 
than one-year residual maturity) to reserves, which played a major role in the 1997-98 financial crisis, 
has fallen sharply in all countries in the region. This is also true for the ratio of total international debt 
and bank liabilities to the BIS reporting banks to reserves. In contrast, notwithstanding some reduction, 
such ratios have remained at a higher level in Latin America or central Europe than in Asia. 
It is much harder to define reserve adequacy levels when the objective is to contain exchange rate 
volatility. In principle, countries allowing their exchange rates to vary freely do not need to hold large 
reserves. In practice, the demand for reserves seems to be negatively related to the degree of 
exchange rate flexibility desired. A general view among central banks is that holding some reserves is 
optimal under a managed floating regime. Such optimality considerations, it is argued, need to 
balance several economic considerations. While a faster rate of currency appreciation could generate 
expectations of future appreciation, low long-term interest rates and overheating of the economy, 
intervention to hold down the exchange rate at a low level could lead to an overexpansion of the 
tradable sector and a build-up of excess capacity in the long run. 
Another factor with significant implications for central banks’ optimal reserve holding is their role in 
some countries as the lender of last resort in the foreign exchange market. For instance, following the 
1995 crisis, under the constant threat of a bank run, the central bank of Mexico often played the role of 
the lender of last resort in dollars. The government boosted foreign exchange reserves by issuing 
$30  billion of dollar-denominated bonds (so called “tesobonos”). As amortisation of tesobonos put 
pressure on the exchange rate, the central bank sold option contracts to repay these bonds. Similarly, 
although Israel follows a free floating regime, the central bank holds a significant amount of reserves 
partly because of its legal obligation to provide foreign exchange to the government as well as to play 
the lender of last resort role in the foreign exchange market. 
                                                       
29  For instance, Aizenman and Marion (2003) argue that Asian countries’ demand for reserves has been led by a greater 
degree of loss aversion of the official and private sector after the 1997-98 crises. 
30  See the paper by Sidaoui in this volume. 
31  See the paper by Mohan in this volume. 32  BIS Papers No 23
 
Table 4 













1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 1996 2003 
China  9 22 11 13    27    9    65    20 
Hong Kong SAR  4  13  19  23    272    61    352    126 
India  6 29 11 21    38    21    107    43 
Indonesia  5 24 14 29    197    41    343    95 
Korea 3  18  6  17    222    41    425    99 
Malaysia  4 11 28 34    44    29    121    129 
Philippines  4  8 21 29    82    80    189    338 
Singapore  7 17 80 77    229    69    249    128 
Thailand  6 13 25 28    125    26    215    70 
Argentina  9 23 29 29    167    221    418    1045 
Brazil  13 25 31 35    90    84    165    275 
Chile  11 21 58 52    53    74    123    230 
Colombia  8 18 48 43    70    37    215    210 
Mexico  3  8 13 16    167    65    507    239 
Peru  16 29 76 54    60    62    76    134 
Venezuela  13 34 89 65    32    25    118    183 
Czech  Republic  5 13 31 40    38    22    83    80 
Hungary  7  6 46 30    59    106    260    395 
Poland  7 16 36 37    14    39    46    163 
Russia  2 21 16 47    235    42    518    123 
Israel  5 18 14 21    18    24    61    93 
Saudi  Arabia  6  8 19 15    46    72    59    97 
South  Africa  0 5 1 6  1234    159    2210    493 
Turkey  5 11 25 29    80    79    211    214 
1  Months of imports.   
2  International debt securities and liabilities to BIS reporting banks with a maturity of less than one 
year, as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves.   
3  International debt securities and liabilities to BIS reporting banks, all 
maturities, as a percentage of foreign exchange reserves. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; BIS statistics. 
 
Domestic aspects 
As reserves rise, their domestic implications tend to attract more attention. Such implications are likely 
to be felt in pressures for sterilising reserve purchases as well as in macroeconomic variables.
32 In 
Asia, reserves have been growing at a particularly rapid rate during the past three years, with reserves 
now accounting for many times the monetary base (Annex Table A6). To the extent that large 
increases in foreign reserves are unsterilised they could lead to an undesirable expansion in the 
monetary base and a loss of monetary control. Even though nominal appreciation has been 
successfully resisted, the real exchange rate would then eventually appreciate as growing capital 
inflows and higher monetary growth raise aggregate demand and inflation.
33 
                                                       
32  See McCauley (2003) for a review of the domestic implications of reserves. 
33  In an operational sense, however, there may be little difference between sterilised and unsterilised intervention for 
managing liquidity when central banks target an overnight interest rate. For instance, on any given day, while foreign 
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Table 5 
Monetary and credit aggregates: 
growth in excess of nominal GDP
1 
Reserve money  Domestic credit to the private sector   
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
China   0.2   9.3   7.1    0.8   10.2   10.0 
Hong Kong SAR    7.5    9.3   18.7    1.4   –0.9   –3.0 
India   0.9   1.1   2.1   5.5   8.6    –1.9 
Indonesia   0.2    –1.5    1.9   1.8   0.2   6.6 
Korea   8.4   2.5   0.9   8.8   8.1   2.3 
Malaysia   5.6    –2.8    0.8    8.6   –2.9   –0.5 
Philippines   –19.0    4.8    2.1   –6.5    –11.5   –1.9 
Singapore   7.2    1.7    2.0   15.9   –3.2    4.0 
Thailand   6.4    –10.1    17.2    –10.8   –7.2   –4.5 
Argentina   21.2    22.2    49.1    –5.2   –27.0   –24.0 
Brazil   3.3    60.4    –12.8   4.0    –2.8   3.3 
Chile   5.9    4.4    –8.0    2.9   –0.7   –0.0 
Colombia   4.6    12.8    6.4   1.8   2.9    –0.2 
Mexico   8.4    15.9    11.1   –2.9   –2.3   –1.3 
Peru   1.3    3.2    –11.5   –2.5   –6.6    –10.0 
Venezuela   4.7    –15.0    28.2 10.9    –11.9    –3.8 
Czech Republic    –1.6    7.3    4.6   –12.8   –29.8    5.2 
Hungary   –13.6    –0.3    2.4   10.4    7.8   24.0 
Poland   5.7   3.9   2.4   5.5   2.4   2.2 
Russia   7.9    8.8  28.8    26.9 16.0 20.9 
Israel   6.7    –17.2    –9.1   11.8    9.4   –5.4 
Saudi Arabia    5.9    1.5   0.6    14.2   9.6   6.2 
South Africa    12.4  33.0    –36.9   –0.8   –2.5    9.3 
Turkey 27.2    –17.5    –20.7   –3.3   –32.2   9.4 
1  Rates of growth relative to the growth in nominal GDP; average values. 
Sources: © Consensus Economics; IMF; national data. 
 
However, focusing on the recent experience, it is hard to find evidence that reserve accretion has led 
to high monetary expansion (Table 5). With the exception of China, in most Asian economies base 
money and domestic credit growth, adjusted for GDP growth, have either fallen or decelerated during 
2001 and 2003.
34 This is also confirmed by the estimates of the degree of sterilisation presented in 
Annex Table A7. In Asia, for example, the long-run elasticity of changes in domestic assets to changes 
in net foreign assets is negative and statistically significant in many countries, suggesting a high 
degree of sterilisation of reserve accumulation. In Latin America, on the other hand, base money grew 
at a relatively faster rate in Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela. However, the weak and, in some 
                                                                                                                                                                       
exchange purchases may add to the flow of autonomous liquidity, they may be offset by a reduction in other sources of 
liquidity such as an increase in government cash surpluses with the central bank: see Borio (1997). 
34  It is not clear whether the recent sharp increase in monetary growth in China has been due to supply side factors as 
commercial banks held large excess reserves with the central banks. The role of other factors such as high demand for 
credit and administrative measures encouraging banks to lend also appear to have played an important role.  34  BIS Papers No 23
 
cases, statistically implausible relationship between domestic credit and reserves suggests that 
reserve changes may not have been a primary source of monetary expansion.
35 
Nevertheless, rapid reserve growth could yet raise several potential challenges for the central bank. 
First, continuous accumulation of reserves might at some point raise problems for the central bank in 
controlling monetary growth even though many countries have so far been successful in sterilising 
reserve operations. One such plausible scenario would be a sustained pickup in demand and inflation, 
requiring the central bank to tighten monetary policy. Reining in excess liquidity in the banking system 
might then become more difficult.  
Second, perceptions that such reserve accumulation is not sustainable may generate expectations of 
future currency appreciation, leading to a sharp decline in long-term interest rates and excessive 
easing of monetary and credit conditions.
36 Moreover, such expected appreciation can encourage 
large unhedged foreign currency borrowing by the private sector, exposing it to future depreciation. 
For example, the appreciation of the rupee and a sharp decline in the forward premium on the dollar in 
India has led many companies to undertake unhedged external borrowing. To curb this, the Reserve 
Bank of India has recently required the corporate sector to hedge its foreign currency borrowing 
beyond a certain amount. Furthermore, the rapid expansion of domestic credit associated with reserve 
expansion can lead to an unsustainable rise in equity or real estate prices, with adverse implications 
for the financial system. China’s recent experience provides an example. A large overhang of liquidity 
in 2003 was associated with rapid expansion in bank credit to the real estate sector and faster growth 
in property prices.
37 To curtail such lending, the People’s Bank of China raised reserve requirements 
and lowered the loan-to-value ratio for mortgage loans.  
Third, another potential challenge could arise if rising reserves created a shortage of instruments for 
sterilisation operations. Currently various instruments are in use: starting from short-term foreign 
exchange swaps and reverse repos to government bonds and central bank bills. In Hungary, the 
central bank has introduced a special deposit facility for banks as a sterilisation instrument. To 
overcome such shortage of instruments, China, Indonesia and Thailand have issued their own bills, 
while the Bank of Korea issues the so-called “monetary stabilisation bonds”. In Poland, the central 
bank converted non-marketable bonds in its portfolio into marketable paper to meet higher sterilisation 
requirements. In Russia, legal problems in issuing its own bills has led the central bank to use reverse 
repo operations to drain short-term liquidity. In India, since the beginning of 2004 the government has 
issued bonds under a special monetary stabilisation scheme to enable the central bank to sterilise its 
foreign exchange intervention.  
Fourth, high levels of reserves could also have wider macroeconomic implications. To the extent that 
reserve accumulation in Asia reflects cyclical conditions, they may be self-correcting as investment 
recovers in the future. According to this view, by holding reserves countries tend to smooth 
consumption and investment over the cycle. But when such reserves reflect deeper structural 
imbalances between domestic saving and investment they have longer-term implications for growth. 
Moreover, McCauley (2003) notes that such domestic implications are even likely to extend to the 
political economy sphere as high levels of reserves create the impression of a “wealthy” government, 
leading to expansion of domestic spending.  
Fifth, high levels of reserves also have implications for the central bank’s balance sheet. A well 
recognised impact is the carrying cost of reserves, which rises if central banks sell domestic high-
yielding bonds in lieu of foreign assets. Such costs are determined by the difference between the 
return on domestic assets and foreign assets. Table A9 in the annex reports the average return of 
central banks on their foreign and domestic assets. In Chile, Hungary, Israel and Korea, the central 
bank’s return on domestic assets is lower than that on foreign assets, implying that on an average 
reserve holdings produced a net return to the central bank. Based on the average returns, Graph 3 
                                                       
35  Excepting Argentina and Mexico, the coefficients are statistically insignificant, implying that the hypothesis of zero values 
cannot be rejected. This also appears to be the case in many other countries in Table A7. 
36  For instance, in 2003 long-term interest rates in many Asian countries (eg China, Singapore and Thailand) fell below that in 
the United States. 
37  McCauley (2003) notes other reasons for rapid credit growth in China: the past overhang of excess liquidity, incentives for 
bank managers to reduce non-performing loans by extending new loans, decentralisation of lending projects and pressures 
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presents one estimate of the cost of sterilisation as a percentage of GDP in 2002. Excepting Peru and 
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1  Calculated as the spread between domestic and foreign asset returns applied to the foreign assets outstanding denominated 
in domestic currency; as a percentage of GDP. 
Sources: Central banks; BIS calculations. 
There could also be other potential and actual costs implied by large reserves. For example, by 
accumulating reserves, central banks are exposed to substantial currency and maturity mismatches. 
While a large part of their foreign assets tend to be invested in long-term paper, their liabilities are 
usually shortened by large and frequent issuance of their own bills to sterilise reserve purchases. 
Moreover, to the extent that large foreign exchange reserves imply considerable negative valuation 
changes due to continuous appreciation of the domestic currency, this exposes the central bank to 
significant currency risks. This has the effect of transferring a large part of the currency risk in the 
private sector to the central bank.
39 
6.  The role of capital account policies 
Capital outflow regulations 
Although not a very popular form of intervention, some attention has, nevertheless, been paid recently 
to using capital account policies to enhance monetary policy independence. For instance, many 
countries in the more distant past used restrictions on capital outflows, either as a preventive or crisis-
time measure, to lower interest rates and revive growth. The objective behind such restrictions was to 
create a systematic wedge between domestic and foreign interest rates. As the uncovered interest 
                                                       
38  However, at the margin, the cost of sterilisation would depend on the difference between the foreign and domestic interest 
rate at a given point in time. Given that the domestic interest rate differentials (when compared to dollar paper) in many 
countries have been positive, the carrying costs of reserves at market interest rate appear to remain significant. 
39  On the other hand, some have argued that such cost calculations do not adequately reflect the positive welfare implications 
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rate parity condition broke down, the authorities could regain control both of the interest rate and of the 
exchange rate. 
However, as Table A10 in the annex shows, most countries have by now either abolished outright 
controls on outflows or substantially diluted them. In contrast, China, India and Malaysia maintain 
relatively tight restrictions on outflows by residents. In Thailand and Korea, corporate lending in foreign 
currency is either limited or requires prior approval; in Chile, Hungary, Peru, Russia and Turkey 
financial institutions’ overseas investments are subject to certain regulations, and in Poland investment 
by residents in overseas real estate is restricted.  
A first reason for the reduced reliance on capital outflow restrictions is their high cost of maintenance 
and reduced effectiveness due to increased trade and financial liberalisation.
40 Second, the growing 
importance of foreign investment has led to liberalisation of capital outflows in the non-residents 
account. In such circumstances, preventing resident outflows alone might not be effective in gaining 
control over the exchange rate. In particular, the growing role of FDI in emerging economies has 
blurred the distinction between resident and non-resident transactions. Third, in many countries, the 
challenges for the authorities may have shifted from containing depreciation to reducing appreciation. 
In such an environment, asymmetric capital account polices that encourage inflows and limit outflows 
can complicate exchange rate management. Japan’s experience in the late 1970s provides a case in 
point; see Fukao (2003). Capital export controls prevented the private sector from investing its large 
export surpluses abroad, leading to strong buying pressure on the yen. The Bank of Japan’s passive 
intervention could not prevent substantial yen appreciation. At the same time, a more active 
intervention by the Bank raised the risk of giving investors a one-way option on the yen, increasing the 
possibility of further appreciation. Upward pressure on the yen did not ease until the liberalisation of 
capital restrictions by the Japanese authorities in the early 1980s.  
Recently such appreciation pressures have led China and India to encourage capital outflows. In the 
former, the authorities have responded by liberalising outflow restrictions, including relaxation of 
merchandise imports and residents’ overseas travel restrictions. Domestic companies and banks have 
been given greater flexibility to issue foreign currency denominated bonds in local markets and raise 
their direct overseas investment. Similarly, India recently liberalised foreign portfolio and direct 
investment by residents and allowed the corporate sector to prepay its external debts.  
Anti-speculative controls  
A second type of control aims at discouraging speculative transactions by restricting non-residents’ 
access to domestic currency. The idea behind such restrictions is to reduce the potential for “shorting” 
the domestic currency. In the absence of controls, the offshore interest rate for domestic currency 
lending is expected to equal to the domestic money market rate. An expectation of depreciation could 
lead investors to borrow domestic currency to buy dollars, and once the exchange rate has fallen to 
sell dollars and book a profit. On the other hand, when non-resident borrowing of domestic currency is 
restricted, offshore interest rates are likely to rise with the borrowing pressure, thus reducing the scope 
for speculative currency attacks. An often cited example of this type of control has been the 
experience of Malaysia during the 1997-98 Asian crisis. Faced with growing speculative currency 
pressures, Malaysia fixed its exchange rate in September 1998, banned offshore trading of the ringgit 
and temporarily suspended repatriation of profits on foreign investment. This subsequently allowed the 
authorities to lower the domestic interest rate and ease fiscal policy. As Table A10 in the annex shows, 
notwithstanding the exchange rate regime, many countries (notably China, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
the Philippines, Poland and Thailand) have restricted non-resident borrowing of domestic currency to 
prevent currency speculation.  
How far such controls are desirable remains an open issue. One view is that emerging economies’ 
financial markets are rather thin and vulnerable to swings in investors’ sentiment. In such 
                                                       
40  Some of the much highlighted costs of controls on capital outflows are that they lead to a sub-optimal policy by reducing 
incentives for major reforms, thus increasing the chance of an eventual financial crisis; reduce investment opportunities for 
residents and encourage inefficient capital use; imply large implementation costs; and increase the scope for corruption; see 
eg Edwards (1999), Eichengreen (2001) and Fisher (1998) on costs and benefits of capital controls. At the same time, 
information and technology developments and increasing use of disguised current account transactions (particularly under-
invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports) have led to large-scale evasion of controls, rendering them less effective 
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circumstances, prudential controls on outflows could cushion some of the potential adverse effects.
41 
Others emphasise the beneficial impact of controls as offering a temporary payments standstill in the 
absence of a lender of last resort in the international capital markets: see Rogoff (1999).
42 A counter 
view attributes emerging economies’ currency crises to weak regulation of financial systems and 
domestic imbalances, which capital controls help to maintain.
43 Moreover, such controls may not be 
effective if currency speculators access the large offshore banking centre or use sophisticated 
financial markets to evade them.  
Such controls can also affect financial market development. For instance, while Singapore dismantled 
most controls on capital movements long ago, it restricted non-residents’ ability to borrow in Singapore 
dollars and to participate in interbank derivative transactions. This discouraged speculative currency 
trading and contributed to enhancing monetary control through the exchange rate instrument. 
Nevertheless, as Tee (2003) notes, such restrictions implied significant cost to the economy by 
adversely affecting capital market liquidity and the development of a domestic bond market, leading to 
significant relaxation in recent years.
44 
Controls on inflows 
Some countries may restrict capital inflows rather than outflows to reduce their vulnerability to external 
shocks. Such controls may tax short-term inflows which are thought to be speculative and hence more 
reversible in nature. The Chilean reserve requirement on capital inflows is often cited. It was said to 
have discouraged short-term inflows and attracted stable long-term inflows. Although evidence is 
inconclusive about whether the tax had a significant impact on the real exchange rate, it seemed to 
have helped the conduct of an independent monetary policy. But recent evidence suggests that such 
inflow restrictions may also have led to an adverse impact particularly on small firms, which faced a 
high risk premium on their borrowings. In addition, the general effectiveness of the tax has also been 
questioned because of its leakage.
45 Another argument against the use of reserve requirements is that 
they may increase the risk premium on long-term borrowing for some countries as investors might be 
less willing to take a long position on their assets.
46 
Not many countries currently differentiate between domestic and foreign liabilities of the banking 
system for the purposes of reserve requirements, although a number of them use other restrictions 
which may work in a similar way to the Chilean tax (Annex Table A11). Argentina has introduced a 
minimum holding period for capital inflows through the banking system, which will effectively 
discourage short-term inflows. In Colombia, although the central bank can ask that a certain 
percentage of capital inflows be held with it, without remuneration, the ratio is currently set to zero. 
Some countries discourage short-term inflows through a differential tax treatment (Colombia) or by 
limiting the maturity for which non-residents can maintain foreign currency deposits (India).  
However, many countries restrict non-resident investment in government securities (eg China, 
Colombia, India and Poland), and some restrict domestic currency lending by non-residents to 
residents. For example, to restrict short-term inflows, Thailand announced a number of restrictions on 
non-resident transactions in 2003. While domestic banks were not allowed to borrow from 
non-residents beyond 50 million baht, restrictions were placed on non-residents’ baht deposits in the 
banking system. By limiting investment vehicles, such restrictions discourage non-residents from 
speculating on the future value of the domestic currency. 
                                                       
41  See Cooper (1998) and Obstfeld (1998). 
42  Some recent studies suggest a positive impact of capital controls on Malaysia’s recovery from the 1997-98 crisis by helping 
it to pursue expansionary demand polices and removing financial uncertainty for domestic investors, although evidence is 
far from conclusive about the effectiveness of such controls: see Kaplan and Rodrik (2001). 
43  Some argue that the imposition of capital controls can lead to unsuccessful devaluation since it restricts the real exchange 
rate correction necessary to correct balance of payments imbalances; see Edwards (1999). 
44  Two major restrictions that still remain are: financial institutions cannot lend to non-residents beyond SGD 5 million where 
such credits may be used for speculative purposes, and any borrowing by non-residents beyond SGD 5 million and 
proceeds of all equity or bond issuance have to be swapped into foreign currency before repatriation; see Tee (2003). 
45  See Edwards (1999) and Forbes (2003) for recent reviews on the Chilean tax on capital inflows. 
46 See  Rogoff  (1999). 38  BIS Papers No 23
 
Table A1 
Monetary and exchange rate regime 
Exchange rate regime  Monetary framework 
 







China  Fixed peg  CB and SAFE
1 Real  effective 
Hong Kong 
SAR  Currency board  HKMA





MT   Multiple 
indicators 
CB Nominal  bilateral, 






MT IT  CB  Nominal  bilateral, 
real and real 
effective 





CB  Nominal and real 




Floating MT  IT  CB  Nominal  bilateral 
and real effective
Singapore
  Exchange rate as an intermediate target  MAS  Nominal effective 
Thailand   Managed 
floating 


















Floating IT  IT  CB  Both  nominal 












Peru Floating  Floating  MT  IT  CB  Nominal  bilateral 











CB and Ministry of 
Finance 










 IT  Government  Nominal  bilateral 
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Table A1 (cont) 
Monetary and exchange rate regime 









Floating MT  IT  Monetary  Policy 
Council, Council 
of Ministers and 
CB 
Nominal bilateral 








IT  IT  Ministry of finance  Nominal bilateral 
Saudi Arabia  Fixed peg     
South Africa  Floating  Floating  MT  IT     
Turkey Managed 
floating 
Floating  IMF program  CB and 
Government 
Nominal and real 
effective 
Note: MT = monetary targeting; IT = inflation targeting. 
1  State Administration of Foreign Exchange.   
2  The Hong Kong Monetary Authority is responsible for the management of 
the Exchange Fund, which is controlled by the Financial Secretary.   
3  Presided by the Secretary of Finance and Public 
Credit.   
4  Since January 2003. 
Sources: IMF; central banks; national data. 




















China    70   1   1    60   0   0 
Hong  Kong  SAR   72   0   0    60   0   0 
India    59   9   4    59   0   0 
Indonesia   72    0    0   28   17   15 
Korea   70    2    0   41   19    0 
Malaysia    67   4   1    60   0   0 
Philippines   62   10    0   46   13    1 
Singapore    70   2   0    56   4   0 
Thailand   72    0    0   48   12    0 
Argentina    69   1   2    46   6   8 
Brazil   24    5   43   22   21   17 
Chile   62    9    1   28   29    3 
Colombia   62    8    1   40   16    4 
Mexico   59    5    8   41   19    0 
Peru   41   20    9   58    2    0 
Venezuela   45   19    8   48    3    9 
Czech  Republic   54   16    2   34   19    7 
Hungary   51   19    2   29   29    2 
Poland   53   14    5   38   17    5 
Russia   19   15   38   51    7    2 
Israel   58   12    2   44   15    1 
South  Africa   58   13    1   31   23    6 
Turkey    6   41   24   16   24   20 
Saudi  Arabia    72   0   0    60   0   0 
Memo:         
Australia   58   14    0   30   28    2 
Canada    69   3   0    52   6   1 
Euro  area   40   28    3   33   25    1 
Japan   47   20    5   33   24    2 
New  Zealand   61   11    0   28   26    6 
United  Kingdom   52   15    5   47   13    0 
United  States   41   27    4   34   24    1 
1  Number of occurrences, in monthly percentage changes. 
Sources: National data; BIS calculations. 
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Table A3 
Foreign currency exposure and hedging market 
  Limits on banks’ 
open positions  Market for hedging  Restrictions on hedging 
China None  Forward  transactions  within 
one year can be used to 
hedge import/export 
positions. 
Proceeds from imports and 
exports can be hedged 
through the main four 
state-owned banks only. 
Hong Kong SAR  5% of the capital base for the 
net overnight position and 10% 
of capital base for each 
currency denominated 
position. Additional specific 
requirements. 
Well developed. Interest 
rate and currency swaps 
plus FX spot and forward 
are available. 
None 
India  Net open positions are limited 
according to Tier 1 and 2 
capital. 
Well developed, FX swaps, 
forwards and options 
available. 
 
Indonesia  Net open position must not 
exceed 20% of bank’s capital. 
Developing market, mainly 
swap and forward. 
Banks cannot maintain 
derivatives exposures. 
Korea  20% of the capital for net open 
position. 
Well developed; options, 
futures and swaps are 
available. 
None 
Malaysia  Yes  Forward and currency 
options are the most used. 
Authorised dealers are 
freely allowed to enter 
forward transactions while 
other residents need 
permission. 
Philippines  Bank’s long forex position may 
not exceed 5% of its 
unimpaired capital or the 
equivalent of USD 10 million. 
Forwards, swaps and 
options are increasingly 
being used. 
Derivatives transactions 
can be operated only by 
authorised intermediaries. 
Singapore  None  The market for forex and 
derivatives is increasingly 
developing. 
Not applicable 
Thailand    Forwards, FX swaps, cross 
currency swaps, interest 
rate swaps and options are 
available. 
None 
Argentina  10% of the computable equity 
liability recorded by an entity 
as of 30 November 2001. 
Limited hedging is 
possible. 
Forward transactions must 
be authorised by the 
central bank unless 
operated in regulated 
markets. 
Brazil  Banks: forex position beyond 
USD 6 million to be deposited 
with the CB; total exposure 
cannot exceed 30% of each 
bank’s base capital.  
Licensed dealers: long 
exchange position maximum 
USD 500,000 and no short 
position is allowed. 
Well developed market; 
forwards, USD futures, 
options on cash USD and 
options on USD futures are 
available. 
None 
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Table A3 (cont) 
Foreign currency exposure and hedging market 
  Limits on banks’ 
open positions  Market for hedging  Restrictions on hedging 
Chile  20% of Tier 1 capital for net 
open positions. 
Forwards, currency and 
cross currency swaps with 
maturity of less than one 
year are available. 
Institutional investors only 
in formal market. Pension 
funds cannot operate in 
swaps and banks cannot 
issue options. 
Colombia    Growing.  Non-residents cannot buy 
derivatives. 
Mexico  15% of Tier 1 capital for net 
open position. 
Well developed; futures on 
USD, interbank and 
corporate bank USD swaps 
and forwards and futures 
on Mexican pesos 
available. 
None 
Peru  Net global position of 
commercial banks varies 
within a limit. 
Only forward market is 
developed (about 2% of 
GDP). 
None 
Venezuela  Net open position must not 
exceed 15%. 
There is no market to 
hedge currency risk with 
institutional financial 
derivatives. 
Capital flows restrictions an 
obstacle for currency risk 
natural hedging. 
Czech Republic  Limit on the net open position.  Well developed; all 
instruments available. 
None  
Hungary  30% of own funds for the net 
open position. 
After 2001 forex 
liberalisation, the market is 
developing faster; main 
contracts available. 
None 
Poland  None  FX swap market well 
developed and forwards 
and options also available.  
None 
Russia  20% of bank’s own funds for 
net open currency position 
and, on each currency, 10% of 
the authorised bank’s funds. 
Futures market available 
but still not developed; 
OTC forwards and options 
also allowed. 
 
Israel  None  Well developed; options, 
FRA and OTC are 
available. 
None 
Turkey  20% of own funds for the net 
open position. 
Forwards and swaps are 
the main contracts used. 
For forward transactions 
the amount must be 
transferred through a bank 
operating in Turkey. 
Saudi Arabia  None  Mostly forwards and 
options. 
None 
South Africa  10% of net qualifying capital 
plus reserves. 
Main instruments are 
available. 
Forward exchange cover 
can be provided only for 
authorised trade and 
non-trade transactions. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Table A4 
Recent experience in containing exchange rate volatility 












China          
Hong Kong SAR           
India None         



































Korea Mar-Apr  2001 
Mar 2003 
No Yes  No None 
Philippines  1 Jan 2001 
2 Jul-Aug 2001 
3 Mar 2003 





Yes  No  The currency rate risk 
protection programme 
was expanded. 
Increase in the liquidity 
reserve requirements 
and improvements in 
the forex operation 
rules. 
Singapore
  Following Sep 11 2001        Additional injection of 
liquidity. 
Thailand  15 Jul 2002  No  Yes  No   Sell/buy swaps in 
offshore markets. 
Argentina Jan  2002  No Yes  Yes   
Brazil Mar-Sep  2001 









Chile  16 Aug-31 Dec 2001  
10 Oct 2002-Feb 2003 
No Yes 
No 
No  Sterilised issuance. 
 
Colombia Aug  2001  No Yes  No  
Mexico  6-17 May 2002 
22 Jan-17 Feb 2003 
5-19 May 2003 
No No  No None 
Change of operative 
instruments. 
None 
Peru  9-26 Apr 2001 
28-31 May 2001 
31 Jul-1 Aug 2002 
3 Sep-4 Oct 2002 
















Venezuela Feb  2002 
Mar 2002 
May-Jun 2002 









Adoption of floating 
regime. 
Adoption of fixed 
regime. 
Czech Republic  Q4 2001-Jul 2002  Yes  Yes  No  None
1 
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Table A4 (cont) 
Recent experience in containing exchange rate volatility 


























Russia None       
Israel  Jan-Jun  2002  No No  No None 
Saudi  Arabia  None       
Turkey  5 Oct 2001; 18 Oct 
2001 
11 Jul 2002; 2 Dec 
2002 
24 Dec 2002;  
12 and 21 May 2003 
9 Jun 2003; 18 Jul 
2003 
No   Yes  No  None 
1  “Privatisation account” was used to calm appreciation pressures. 



























1 and performance 
2000 2001 2002 2003 
 
Target/reference Actual Target/reference  Actual Target/reference Actual Target/reference Actual 
Medium-term 
target/reference 
China   …   …   …    …   …    …   …    …    … 
Hong Kong SAR
2   11   –3.7    0.0   –1.6   –1.5    –3    –1.5    –2.6   
India
3   4.5    4.9    5    1.6    4   6.5    5-5.5   4.6   
Indonesia   3-5    5.9
4   4-6    8.7
4   9-10    10    9    5.1    6-7 
Korea    2.5 ± 1    1.9    3 ± 1    3.6    3 ± 1    3    3 ± 1    3.1    2.5-3.5 
Malaysia    3.2    1.6    1.5 ± 2   1.4    1.8   1.8    1.5    1.1   
Philippines   …    4.4    …    6.1    4.5-5.5   3.1    4.5-5.5   3.1    4-5 
Singapore
5   1-2    1.3    1-2    1    –1-0.0   –0.4    0.5-1.5    0.5    1-2 
Thailand   0-3.5    0.7    0.0-3.5   1.3   0-3.5   0.4   0-3.5    1.8    0-3.5 
Argentina
6   1    –0.7    0.5    –1.5   …    41    15-5    3.7   
Brazil    6 ± 2    6    4 ± 2    7.7    3.5 ± 2    12.5    8.5    9.3    5.5 ± 2.5 
Chile   3.5    4.6    2-4    2.6   2-4    2.8    2-4    1.1    2-4 
Colombia    10    8.8   8    7.6   6    7    5-6    6.5     3 
Mexico        6.5    4.4    4.5    5.7    3 ± 1    4.0    3 ± 1 
Peru   3.5-4    3.7    2.5-3.5    –0.1    2.5 ± 1    1.5    1.5 
7   2.5   
Venezuela   15    13.4    10    12.3   20    31.2    <  31.2    27.1   
Czech Republic    3.5-5.5    3    2-4
8   2.4    3-5   1.8     2.7-4.7    0.1    2-4 
Hungary    …    10.1    7 ± 1    6.8    4.5 ± 1    4.8    4.5    5.7    Maastricht 
Poland   5.4-6.8    8.5    6-8    3.6    3 ± 1    0.8    3 ± 1    1.7   
Israel   3-4    0    2.5-3.5    1.4   2-3    6.5   1-3    –1.9    2 
South Africa    …    7.7    …    6.6   3-6    9.3   3-6    6.0    3-6 
Turkey
9      25    39   12    68.5   35    29.7    20    18.4    Single  digit 
1  Targets in place at the beginning of the year; in per cent.   
2  The HKMA does not target inflation, the targets shown refer to the forecast composite CPI; for 2002 target, GDP deflator 
shown.   
3  India does not have an inflation target; however, indicative projections regarding the inflation rate are made at the beginning of the year.   
4  For 2000 and 2001, Bank Indonesia 
used CPI excluding the impact of government prices and incomes policies as a target, realised CPI was 9.4% and 12.6% respectively.   
5  MAS does not have an explicit inflation 
target.   
6  The BCRA does not target inflation formally, but the revision of the 2003 Monetary Programme contained a range for inflation.   
7  Forecast.   
8  End of period.   
9  The Central Bank 
of Turkey has not yet started to formally target inflation. 
Source: Central banks. 
  





1995 2000 2003 1995 2000 2003   
In billions of US dollars  As a percentage of reserve money 
China  74    166    403   29   36   60 
Hong Kong SAR    55    108    118  516    389    314 
India    17   37   98   35   61    114 
Indonesia    13    28    35   113   173   145 
Korea    32    96   155    84   429   452 
Malaysia    23    29    43   122   263   363 
Philippines   6   13   13   64    163    165 
Singapore    68    80    95   567   747   782 
Thailand    35    32    41   221   197   172 
Argentina    14   24   13    100    162   76 
Brazil    50   32   49    120   95   76 
Chile    14    15    15   477   432   422 
Colombia    8    8    10   125   168   168 
Mexico    15    35    58   143   126   133 
Peru    8    8    10   193   126   136 
Venezuela    6    13    16   177   152   217 
Czech  Republic    14    13    26   257   246   248 
Hungary    12    11    12   229   210   143 
Poland    15    26    32   129   233   181 
Russia    14   24   73   51   91    111 
Israel    8    23    26   132   117   179 
Saudi  Arabia  7   18   18   48   99     88 
South  Africa    3    6    6   41   71   59 
Turkey    12    22    34   146   148   212 
1  Values at end of period. 
Sources: IMF, International Financial Statistics; national data. 
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Table A7 
An estimate of the degree of sterilisation
1 
Without controlling 
for output and inflation 
After controlling 
for output and inflation 
 
Short-run Long-run  R
2 Short-run  Long-run R
2 
China   –0.156    –0.938  0.84   –0.167    –0.945  0.84 
   (–2.421)*       (–2.396)*     
India   –0.283    –1.329  0.92   –0.249    –1.476  0.88 
   (–3.558)**       (–2.896)**     
Indonesia   –0.074    –0.496  0.88   –0.045    –0.141  0.90 
   (–1.724)       (–1.251)     
Korea   –0.329    –0.793  0.76   –0.332    –0.792  0.75 
   (–7.137)**       (–6.836)**     
Malaysia   0.014    0.068  0.60   0.069    0.216  0.70 
   (0.317)       (1.656)     
Philippines   0.130    1.137 0.83    0.166    1.265 0.83 
   (1.398)       (1.497)     
Argentina   –0.224    –2.721  0.94   –0.273    –2.131  0.95 
   (–1.663)       (–1.748)     
Brazil   0.073    0.596  0.86   0.052    0.530  0.86 
   (1.386)      (0.956)    
Chile   0.127    1.006  0.81   0.076    0.415  0.82 
   (1.539)       (0.891)     
Colombia   –0.496    –3.241  0.77   –0.343    –1.514  0.78 
   (–1.437)       (–0.929)     
Mexico   –1.910    –2.800  0.42   –2.043    –3.022  0.39 
   (–1.895)       (–1.441)     
Peru   0.496  0.920  0.21   0.539    1.002  0.18 
   (0.758)       (0.747)     
Venezuela   –0.014    –0.027 0.54    0.031  0.056 0.57 
   (–0.179)       (0.439)    
Czech Republic    –0.122    –1.555 0.83    –0.229    –2.462 0.86 
   (–1.194)       (–2.195)*     
Hungary 0.058    0.254  0.91   0.060    0.299  0.91 
   (3.028)**       (3.082)**     
Poland   –0.087    –1.575  0.83   –0.087    –0.647  0.65 
   (–0.785)       (–0.068)     
Russia   –0.063    –0.156  0.91   –0.062    –0.153  0.91 
   (–5.059)**       (–4.523)**     
Israel   –0.148    –0.313  0.43   –0.148    –0.296  0.33 
   (–2.018)       (–1.545)     
South Africa    –0.022    –0.064 0.41    –0.100    –0.228 0.45 
   (–0.253)       (–1.090)     
Turkey   –0.216    –2.452  0.81   –0.821    –7.012  0.82 
   (–0.283)       (–1.013)     
1  Estimated through the following two equations: (1) ∆DCt = α0 + α1 ∆NFAt + α2 ∆DCt–1 + εt; (2) ∆DCt = β0 + β1 ∆NFAt + 
β2 ∆DCt–1 + β3 GAPt + β4 INFt + ut; where DC is the log of domestic credit in the central bank balance sheet, NFA is the 
log of outstanding reserves of the central bank, GAP is the output gap calculated as the deviation from the long-term trend 
output (calculated with the HP filter) and INF is the inflation rate; sample period from 1999:01 to 2003:05. For Mexico 2000 to 
2003. A long-run coefficient value close to –1 implies full sterilisation and between 0 and –1 partial sterilisation. 
* , ** denote coefficients significantly different from zero at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
Source: BIS estimates. 
  





Did the central 




to meet the shortage 
Was unsterilised 
intervention used? 
India No    Sometimes 
Indonesia No    No 
Korea No    No 
Philippines  No    During 1993-95 not fully sterilised 
operations. 
Singapore
  No    Yes (for example in 1985) 
Thailand  Sometimes    Short tenor FX swaps  According to the appropriate 
liquidity management there might 
be unsterilised interventions. 
Argentina  Yes    Central Bank bills  Yes 
Brazil No    No 
Chile No    Yes  (1998) 
Colombia No    No 
Mexico No    No 
Peru No    Yes 
Venezuela  Yes    Modified reserve requirements  Yes 
Czech Republic  No    No 
Poland  Yes (1999)    The NBP reached an agreement 
  with the Ministry of Finance to 
  convert non-marketable debt into 
 marketable  Treasury  bonds. 
No 
Russia  Yes (after crisis 
in 1998) 
Modified reverse repo operations  Market operations are used to 
exercise general control over 
liquidity. 
Israel No    No 
Saudi Arabia  …  …  … 
South Africa  No     
Turkey No    Yes 
Source: Central banks. 
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Table A9 
Income and balance sheet of the central bank 
Return on foreign assets
1  Return on domestic assets
1   
2000 2001 2002 2000 2001 2002 
Hong Kong SAR    6.0    2.9   6.6   –4.4   –14.5   –12.8 
India   4.3   5.3   3.7   7.4   5.4   7.9 
Korea   5.7   7.8   6.0   5.1   4.0   4.1 
Brazil   10.7   21.8   63.8   18.1   15.5   24.1 
Chile   11.6   17.2   15.6   10.5   10.1   5.7 
Colombia   5.5   4.7   6.6   11.0   16.3   12.4 
Peru   6.0   4.2   2.4 20.0    0.0 25.0 
Venezuela    3.1   11.6   7.5   10.9   9.0   16.0 
Czech Republic    3.6    –2.3   0.1   3.6   2.0   2.5 
Hungary   11.4   11.4   10.4   10.8   11.0   7.7 
Poland   6.5   5.7   4.5   19.4  14.3   21.3 
Israel    –0.4   4.6   4.7   –46.9   –57.4   –51.5 
Saudi  Arabia   4.7   0.7   3.5       
Turkey   –0.9   –5.5   –1.2   –104.8   3.4   2.8 
1  Calculated as income over outstanding assets. 
Source: Central banks.  
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Table A10 
Controls on capital outflows 
  Are there limits on 
corporate lending or 
investment abroad? 
Are non-residents 
allowed to borrow in 
domestic currency? 
Other restrictions 
China  Non-financial firms are 
forbidden to provide credit 
abroad and financial firms 
need approval from the 
People’s Bank of China. 
Investing in foreign 
securities is limited to 
eligible institutions. 
Yes  Under a new SAFE
1 
legislation, regions are 
given a foreign exchange 
quota (USD 200 million) 
that can be invested 
abroad after approval of 
local SAFE.  
Hong Kong SAR  No  Yes  None 
India  Firms can invest in equity 
and rated bonds/fixed 
income securities up to 
25% of net worth of listed 
foreign companies which 
have at least 10% stake in 
Indian companies. Same 
for individuals but there is 
no limit. 
Only Authorised Dealers 
can grant loans to 
non-resident Indians.  
Trusts are not permitted to 
invest abroad. 
Indian residents cannot 
invest in foreign real estate 
or banking companies. 
Other restrictions apply to 
investment through special 
purpose vehicles, joint 
ventures and Indian 
software companies. 
Indonesia Banks  cannot  purchase 
securities denominated in 
local currency but issued 
by non-residents.  
Lending to non-residents is 
prohibited. 
Net liabilities in foreign 
currency may not exceed 
10% of shareholders’ 
equity. Insurance 
companies and mutual 
funds cannot invest 
abroad. 
Korea  Corporate lending abroad 
in foreign currency must be 
declared to the BOK and if 
the amount exceeds 
USD 10 million, approval 
from the Authority is 
needed. 
No limits on portfolio 
investments. 
Lending from a bank for 
more than one million won 
requires approval from the 
BOK. Lending from 
institutional investors, 
companies and individuals 
needs approval from the 
BOK. 
Residents’ portfolio 
investments are required to 
be done through domestic 
securities companies. 
Malaysia Amounts  exceeding 
MYR 10,000 need 
permission. Unit trust 
companies can invest up to 
10% of their net asset 
value or MYR 10 million. 
Financial institutions: up to 
three property loans to 
finance purchase of 
immovable property in 
Malaysia; banks: up to 
MYR 200,000 to a 
non-resident with external 
accounts in Malaysia, up to 
MYR 5 million to finance 
projects in Malaysia, up to 
MYR 500,000 overdraft 
facilities, up to 
MYR 200 million intraday 
or MYR 10 million 
overnight to finance 
payments of shares 
purchased on KLSE. 
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Table A10 (cont) 
Controls on capital outflows 
  Are there limits on 
corporate lending or 
investment abroad? 
Are non-residents 
allowed to borrow in 
domestic currency? 
Other restrictions 
Philippines  None for corporate, banks 
may sell up to 
USD 6 million to residents 
without approval from the 
central bank. 
No peso loans allowed to 
non-residents. 
The limit of USD 6 million 
also applies to purchases 
abroad of bonds; greater 
amounts need approval 
from the central bank. 
Sales and issues of debt 
securities abroad by 
residents always require 
prior approval by the 
central bank. 
Singapore  No   Banks may lend up to 
USD 5 million to 
non-residents. 
None 
Thailand  Corporate lending is 
permitted up to 
USD 10 million. Bank of 
Thailand approval is 
required for portfolio 
investments. 
For credit not guaranteed 
by any activities in 
Thailand, maximum 
THB 50 billion. Loans can 
be made to neighbouring 
countries under approval of 
the Bank of Thailand.  
None 
Argentina  Purchases are limited to 
USD 500,000. 
Yes  
Brazil  Residents may invest in 
debt securities through 
dedicated offshore 
investment funds and only 
in stock exchanges in 
Mercosur countries. 
Only financial institutions 
are restricted in lending to 
non-resident domestic 
financial entities. 
Authorisation by the BCB is 
required when the 
purchaser of the foreign 
exchange is an entity 
belonging to the public 
administration. 
Chile  No  Yes  Banks are subject to a limit 
on the type of instrument 
they can invest in, and to 
provision requirements. 
Central Bank must also be 
informed of any foreign 
investments. Insurance 
companies can invest up to 
20% of their technical 
reserves and risk capital. 
Pension funds can invest 
25% of its resources 
abroad. 
Colombia Investment  exceeding 
USD 500,000 must be 
registered at the central 
bank. 
Yes None 
Mexico  Pension funds are 
forbidden to invest abroad, 
they can only invest up to 
10% of their assets in 
securities issued by 
Mexicans abroad.  
Yes None  
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Table A10 (cont) 
Controls on capital outflows 
  Are there limits on 
corporate lending or 
investment abroad? 
Are non-residents 
allowed to borrow in 
domestic currency? 
Other restrictions 
Peru  Pension funds have an 
operational limit of 9% and 
a legal limit of 20%. 
Banks can invest in foreign 
financial entities from 5% 
to 50% of total risk-
adjusted capital, and in 
foreign non-financial 
institutions between 5% 
and 30% of the same 
capital. 
Yes None 
Venezuela No  Yes   
Czech Republic  No  Yes  N/A 
Hungary  Institutional investors are 
restricted to certain 
investment limits. 
Yes None 
Poland  No limits on corporate 
lending or investing in 
OECD countries and in 
Lichtenstein. 
Residents cannot grant 
loans to non-residents in 
third countries.
2 
Investment in real estate is 
restricted. 
Russia  Portfolio investment abroad 
requires permission from 
the Bank of Russia. 
Individuals can transfer up 
to USD 7,500 in foreign 
markets. 
Yes  Russian credit institutions 
are required to create a 
reserve for operations with 
offshore residents. 
Israel No  Yes  None 
Saudi Arabia  None  Yes  None 
South Africa  Insurers, pension funds 
and investment managers 
can invest up to 15% of 
their total assets abroad. 
Collective investment 
schemes up to 20%. 
Yes, but they can only 
borrow the equivalent rand 
value of the foreign 
exchange they bring into 
the country. 
Private individuals can 
invest up to ZAR 750,000 
outside CMA; corporates 
up to ZAR 2 billion for each 
new investment in Africa 
and ZAR 1 billion in the 
rest of the world. 
Turkey  Only banks can extend 
credit abroad. Portfolio 
investments can be made 
only through financial 
institutions registered with 
the Capital Market 
Legislation. 
Yes  Transfer of capital in kind 
or in cash for more than 
USD 5 million requires 
approval. 
1  State Administration of Foreign Exchange. 
Source: Central banks. 
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Table A11 
Controls on capital inflows 
  Restrictions on 
non-residents’ 
transactions 
Explicit or implicit taxes 
on capital inflows or 
currency positions 
Other restrictions 
China Forward/future  or  spot 
foreign exchange rate is “in 
practice” not permitted. 
Qualified foreign institutional 
investors
 can invest in 
domestic securities up to a 
certain quota. 
7% on reserve requirements 
on resident and 
non-resident deposits and 
on domestic currency 
deposits; 2% on foreign 
currency deposits in 
domestic banks and 3% or 
5% on the same deposits 
but in foreign banks. 
Equity financing abroad 
needs approval from the 
China Securities Regulatory 
Commission. 
Hong Kong SAR  None  None  None 
India  Non-residents of non-Indian 
origin cannot invest either in 
government securities or in 
non-convertible debentures; 
foreign institutional investors 
can invest up to 30% of their 
total investment in 
government securities; only 
persons of Indian origin can 
invest in acceptance of 
deposits. Citizens of 
Bangladesh, Pakistan or 
Sri Lanka cannot invest in 
equities. 
No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements 
ADRs are possible. 
Indonesia  Forward, swap sales or 
options against rupiah by 
domestic banks to 
non-residents are limited to 
USD 3 million except for 
investment related 
transactions. Other controls 
apply to various transactions 
with non-residents. 
None None 
Korea  Investment in some 
infrastructure-related firms is 
limited to 30-50% of total 
stock issued. 
No distinction in treatment in 
reserve requirements; 1% 
on overseas emigrant 
accounts; 2% on foreign 
currency time deposits, 
foreign currency instalment 
savings and foreign 
currency CDs in resident 
account. 
There are 10 companies 
listed on the NYSE in the 
form of ADRs. Borrowings 
exceeding USD 30 million 
must be declared to the 
Ministry of Finance and 
Economy. 
Malaysia  None  No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. 
ADRs and GDRs available. 
Philippines  90-day holding period on 
peso deposits by 
non-residents. 
All peso deposits are 
subject to the same reserve 
requirements; full asset 
cover on foreign currency 
deposits. Capital gains from 
sale of real property are 
taxed (6%), as well as those 
from sale of shares not 
traded on the stock 
exchange (5%-10%). 
ADRs are possible. 
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Table A11 (cont) 
Controls on capital inflows 
  Restrictions on 
non-residents’ 
transactions 
Explicit or implicit taxes 
on capital inflows or 
currency positions 
Other restrictions 
Singapore  None  None  SGX has a co-trading 
agreement with ASX. 
Thailand  Thai baht credit facilities to 
non-residents, without 
underlying trade or 
investment activities in 
Thailand, are subject to a 
THB 50 million limit. 
None None 
Argentina  Forward agreements must 
be authorised by the Central 
Bank. 
No distinction in treatment 




Brazil Non-residents’  access  to 
spot or forward/future forex 
markets is restricted. 
A 5% tax applies to inflows 
with minimum maturity of up 
to 90 days. A 2% tax is 
applied to remittances 
related to obligations of 
credit card administration 
companies. 
Only domestic regulation 
provisions. 
Chile  No restrictions, amounts 
greater than USD 10 million 
only negotiated in the formal 
exchange market. 
No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. 
ADRs are available and 
Chilean companies can also 
be listed in the Latibex (a 
Madrid-based stock 
exchange for Latin American 
companies). Investments 
through foreign investment 
funds must be held in Chile 
for at least five years. 
Colombia  Purchase of forward and 
futures locally is restricted to 
registered investors; sale or 
issue of the same 
instruments is not allowed to 
non-residents. Approval 
needed for purchase of 
shares of Colombian 
institutions exceeding 10%; 
non-residents can invest up 
to 20% of the total issue; 
investments at a fixed 
interest rate must have 
maturity no longer than two 
years. 
Only domestic currency 
deposits are subject to 
reserve requirement. 7% tax 
on remittances of earnings 
on foreign investment, 
unless earnings are 
reinvested for five years. 3% 
tax on forex receipts from 
personal services. 
Sale or issue of securities 
needs approval from the 
Securities Superintendence. 
Mexico  None  No distinction in treatment 




Peru  None  No distinction in treatment in 
resident and non-resident 
reserve requirements. 
Foreign currency deposits 
have a supplementary 
requirement of 20% on 
excess holdings. 
Agreements with NYSE and 
NASDAQ exist for dual 
listing of securities (common 
stocks and ADRs). 
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Table A11 (cont) 
Controls on capital inflows 
  Restrictions on 
non-residents’ 
transactions 
Explicit or implicit taxes 
on capital inflows or 
currency positions 
Other restrictions 
Venezuela  Currency can only be sold 
to an authorised exchange 
dealer. 
  A few companies have 
access to the issue of ADRs. 
Czech Republic  None  No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. 
ADR listing is possible. 
Hungary  None  No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. 
ADR listing is possible. 
Licence from the Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory 
Authority is required for the 
offering of domestic 
securities abroad. 
Poland  Minimum one-year maturity 
for investment in 
government securities. 
Non-resident deposits with 
maturity of more than two 
years are excluded from the 
reserve base. 
At least half of borrowings 
abroad should have a 
maturity of not less than one 
year. 
Russia  No transfer of rouble funds 
to C-type (conversion) 
accounts is possible. 
None  Permission of the Bank of 
Russia is required to raise 
capital abroad. 
Israel  None  No distinction in treatment 




South Africa  Any dealings in the 
derivatives market must 
relate to legitimate South 
African exposure resulting 
from an accrual, investment 
or asset denominated in 
rand. 
No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. 
Outward and inward dual 
listings require approval. 
Turkey  None  No distinction in treatment 
between resident and 
non-resident reserve 
requirements. The ratio on 
foreign currency deposits is 
11% (that on domestic 
deposits is 6%). 
None 
Saudi Arabia  None  No distinction in treatment 




Note: ADR = American depository receipt; GDR = Global depository receipt. 
Source: Central banks. 
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